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A fundamental proposition of the resource-based view of the firm is that a firm with 
resources that are valuable and rare may generate competitive advantages over its rivals, thereby 
resulting in temporary superior economic performance (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 
1993).  For a firm to sustain its competitive advantage and its superior economic performance, 
the resources must also be inimitable and non-substitutable to prevent rivals from replicating the 
value of these resources and thus competing away their economic benefits.  It then follows that 
the sustainability of a firm’s competitive advantage is directly related to the strength of “isolating 
mechanisms” that prevent rival imitation or substitution (Rumelt, 1984; Mahoney and Pandian, 
1992). 
Firm-specificity in resources is typically considered one such isolating mechanism. Firm-
specific resources are not perfectly mobile and are not easily tradable outside of a firm (Dierickx 
and Cool, 1989). This feature of firm-specific resources makes it more difficult for competitors 
to imitate. Furthermore, since by definition, firm-specific resources are likely to be economically 
valued more by the firms who own these resources than by other firms, the other firms have less 
incentive to imitate or expropriate these resources that would yield lower economic value.  
Among the types of firm-specific resources that have been examined, the resource- and 
knowledge-based research literatures have generally maintained that firm-specific knowledge has 
the greatest potential to serve as a source of sustainable performance advantage because of the 
increasingly important role of knowledge resources in modern corporations. A firm’s knowledge 
base is the information inputs, knowledge, and capabilities that organizational members draw on 
when searching for innovative solutions (Dosi, 1988); accordingly, firm-specific knowledge is 
often the result of firms searching and accumulating new knowledge in areas that enable them to 
build upon their established knowledge base (Nelson and Winter 1982, Teece 1986, Cohen and 
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Levinthal 1989). Such firm-specific knowledge resources may include skills needed to complete 
specific tasks of the firm, capabilities required to operate or maintain customized equipments, 
and information about specialized job practices for manufacturing unique products (Døving and 
Nordhaug, 2002). Although knowledge resources in general are subject to diffusion across firms, 
the resource-based view of the firm (Barney 1991, Peteraf 1993) suggests that firm-specificity in 
knowledge resources can help the firm appropriate greater economic value from these resources. 
For example, Helfat (1994) argues that firm-specific knowledge and innovation enables a firm to 
be in a better position to appropriate the economic rents from its R&D investments.  
However, it is rarely the case that a firm’s physical and organizational capital alone can 
achieve superior economic performance through deploying firm-specific knowledge resources. 
Instead, the firm often requires its key employees to make accompanying investments in human 
capital, in the process of absorbing and deploying firm-specific knowledge.  When a firm’s key 
rent-generating knowledge resources are firm specific, the required human capital investments 
from the firm’s key employees are also likely to increase in the level of specificity.  Similar to 
other types of firm-specific investments, employees’ firm-specific human capital is not tradable 
or is valued less economically in external labor markets than in the specific firm setting.   
Therefore, the same features of firm-specific knowledge that constitute potential sources 
of sustainable competitive advantage are also likely to give rise justifiably to key employees’ 
reluctance to make accompanying firm-specific human capital investments. Because employees’ 
firm-specific human capital are less valuable in other business settings and are therefore not 
transferable to other jobs, in the absence of complete contracts, employees’ investing in such 
human capital would create a situation for potential holdup by the firm ex post. Thus, employees 
with foresight might be reluctant to make specific human capital investments that would place 
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themselves in a potentially weak (ex post) bargaining position. For example, computer software 
firms that focus on developing and applying certain proprietary software languages generally 
have a high level of firm-specific knowledge. And it is often the case that software engineers are 
reluctant to invest in learning such proprietary languages because their skills developed therein 
will become irrelevant elsewhere. 
Consequently, in the absence of effective economic safeguards for these key employees, 
it is difficult for a firm to realize the potential economic rents that can be generated by its firm-
specific knowledge resources. Thus, a fundamental question is how to enlist the cooperation of 
key employees to make human capital investments that are firm-specific, without ceding to them 
excessive economic rents generated from deploying the resource (Rajan and Zingales, 1998).  
The current paper emphasizes that characteristics of firm-specific knowledge are likely to 
lead to employees’ reluctance to invest in accompanying firm-specific human capital.  Thus, it is 
theoretically sound to anticipate that a firm’s governance system, which is established to align its 
employees’ economic interests with that of the firm, is endogenous to the firm’s resource 
composition. This issue that has been raised based on organizational economics theory (Rajan 
and Zingales, 2001; Mahoney 2005) leads to classical organization theory solutions (Ouchi, 
1980; Eisenhardt, 1985). In particular, because the employee’s investments in specific human 
capital are often unobservable, it is unlikely that firms can either effectively monitor the 
employee or design a compensation contract that directly compensates the employee for making 
an appropriate level of specific human capital investment. Accordingly, the ineffectiveness of 
behavior control and direct compensation is likely to induce the firm to rely more heavily on 
outcome-based incentives (Eisenhardt, 1985) and/or “clan” socialization mechanisms (Ouchi, 
1980) to influence their employees’ behavior.  
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More specifically, the current paper considers two general mechanisms that are available 
for firms to mitigate the under-investment in firm-specific human capital by its key employees: 
economic-based means such as employee stock ownership and relationship-based means such as 
long-term firm-employee relationships. Given the well-established theoretical argument in the 
organizational economics research literature that there would otherwise be an under-investment 
in firm-specific human capital, the current paper maintains that the appropriate use of such 
classical organization theory solutions enables firms to achieve a greater level of economic 
performance from their firm-specific knowledge resources. 
 
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Background  
 
 
The existence of, and solution to, employee governance problems are critically important 
in understanding economic rents generated by firm-specific knowledge resources. In particular, 
firm-specific knowledge can only influence potential economic rents. The governance of the 
firm’s employees, who help deploy such knowledge in the economic value creating process, 
moderate the de facto economic rents generated by the firm.  Indeed, it is likely that the next 
generation of resource-based theory and empirical research will place greater emphasis on the 
logic that a firm’s resource base and the effectiveness of its governance system jointly influence 
its economic performance (Makadok, 2003; Kim and Mahoney, 2005; Gottschalg and Zollo, in 
press). 
Early discussions on the issues associated with employee investments in specific human 
capital can be found in the human capital theory, which is best exemplified by the seminal work 
of Becker (1964). A fundamental premise of the theory is that because specific human capital has 
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limited economic value in alternative settings, efficient outcomes may be achieved under the 
condition that the costs and returns of specific human capital investments are shared between the 
firm and the employees (e.g., Becker, 1964; Bartel and Borjas, 1977; Hashimoto, 1981). One 
limitation of the human capital theory, however, is that this theory does not explicitly take into 
consideration the underinvestment problem, or the transaction costs threat of holdup as a result 
of incomplete contracting, which is a fundamental impediment to the sharing of the costs and 
returns of specific human capital (Williamson, 1975, 1985; Glick and Feuer, 1984).   
Some of the key issues associated with incomplete contracts and underinvestment are 
addressed by property rights theory (Demsetz, 1967; Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 
1990; Ranjan and Zingales, 1998). The fundamental idea in property rights theory is that in a 
world of positive transaction costs, the allocation of property rights over an asset is crucial in 
determining efficiency in deploying the asset (Coase, 1960). When contracts are incomplete, the 
anticipated profit sharing influences ex ante the willingness for transaction partners to specialize 
(Hart and Moore, 1990). A more recent work by Foss and Foss (2005) has applied and extended 
the ideas in property rights theory to the resource-based research literature. Foss and Foss (2005) 
maintain that the ability for a resource owner to create, appropriate, and sustain economic value 
from resources is influenced by transaction costs (which include the costs of inducing employees 
to invest in specific human capital). Property rights theory raises concerns of underinvestment 
and suggests an economic-based solution to the employee underinvestment problem: ownership 
of firm resources provides employees with more secure economic profit appropriation, fostering 
the economic incentives of employees to make specific human capital investments within a firm.   
In addition to the organizational economics literature on the theory of property rights, a 
few management research studies also examine issues relevant to employee governance issues. 
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Castanias and Helfat (1991, 2001) address governance issues in economic rent generation by top 
managers, and maintain that even when managers have the potential to generate economic rents 
by deploying their human capital, the total amount of potential rents are not automatically 
realized if incentives are lacking or misdirected. Coff (1997) develops a fairly comprehensive 
framework for analyzing and coping with challenges associated with managing human resources. 
These coping strategies include economic- and relationship-based employee governance 
mechanisms such as employee retention through firm-specific pay and job satisfaction, profit 
sharing, and organizational design. Gottschalg and Zollo (in press) explore the roles of both 
extrinsic and intrinsic governance mechanisms and their alignment with the firm on competitive 
advantage. Their analysis highlights the strategic relevance of employee governance mechanisms 
in enabling a firm to achieve competitive advantage.   
The current paper directly examines the issue of employee governance mechanisms for 
economic rent generation, and both builds upon but goes beyond previous research studies in 
several aspects. First, while previous research studies discuss issues associated with employee 
governance primarily in general terms, the current paper directly takes into consideration firm 
heterogeneity in knowledge assets and emphasizes a contingency view of employee governance 
systems. The paper maintains that employee governance mechanisms are endogenous to the 
nature of firm knowledge resources.  Second, while most research studies focus on financial-
based governance mechanisms (with the exception of Gottschalg and Zollo, in press), the current 
paper also explores the role of trust and relationship building between the firm and its employees. 
Third, this paper emphasizes that the level of firm-specific knowledge only defines the firm’s 
potential in generating economic rents. The realized rents generated by such knowledge are 
moderated by the effectiveness of firm governance mechanisms. Lastly, this paper provides 
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systematic empirical tests of these arguments, which to our knowledge, none of the previous 
studies have done.  
 
Firm-Specific Knowledge Resources and Superior Firm Performance 
 
The resource-based view typically considers firms as bundles of heterogeneous resources 
that include tangible and intangible resources, and operational processes and products (Amit and 
Schoemaker, 1993). Among the resources examined, knowledge is often considered as the most 
important resource of the firm (Grant, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992).  Firm knowledge can be 
broadly classified into two types: firm-specific knowledge and general knowledge. If a firm 
pursues new knowledge close to its existing knowledge bases and with specific application to its 
own business setting, it is likely to develop firm-specific knowledge — knowledge that is more 
useful within the firm but has less applicability across firm boundaries (Pavitt, 1990; Helfat, 
1994). Alternatively, other firms may choose to place a greater emphasis on the development of 
general knowledge, which is more often built upon the knowledge that is available in the market 
and is less specialized in their own firm settings.  
Different knowledge accumulation and development strategies result in key differences 
across firms in the degree of firm-specificity of their knowledge resources. These inter-firm 
differences in knowledge accumulation and utilization strategies, and the resulting differences in 
the degree of firm-specificity of knowledge resources can have important implications for the 
firms’ economic performance.  Because firm-specific knowledge resources are immobile and are 
not easily tradable outside a firm, such resources have greater economic value if applied within 
the particular firm than if these resources are used in other business settings. This feature of firm-
specific knowledge makes them rare and less likely to be subject to rival imitation and therefore 
the firm may be able to benefit more economically from deploying firm-specific, rather than 
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general, knowledge (Peteraf, 1993).1 For example, Helfat (1994) emphasizes that firms are better 
able to appropriate the economic rents generated from their firm-specific R&D activities, a key 
input of firm-specific knowledge: 
…The outcome of firm-specific R&D can prove difficult for other firms to imitate, if they 
do not have access to the assets to which the R&D was applied. Additionally, the firm-
specific nature of the R&D process further impedes imitation: when the R&D process has 
an important tacit element, it is difficult for others outside of the firm to replicate 
dynamic routines to support new process and product development, other firms may be 
left playing catch up, for example, by trying to reverse engineer products once another 
firm has introduced them. Essentially, the difficulty of imitating (or finding effective 
substitutes for) other firms’ R&D processes or outcomes retards the diffusion of technical 
knowledge across firms. This in turn enhances appropriability, since direct competition 
between firms in R&D is reduced… (Helfat, 1994, p. 175) 
 
 Moreover, the organizational learning literature suggests that because organizational 
learning is a cumulative process that concentrates in areas of prior knowledge accumulation, 
firms have a higher likelihood of successful knowledge application in areas in which they have 
had prior and firm-specific experience (Stuart and Podolny, 1996). The increased likelihood of 
success of firm-specific knowledge deployment further induces consistent investments in 
necessary complementary assets, including human and financial resources and physical facilities 
(Teece, 1986). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that a firm’s knowledge stock will produce 
superior financial outcomes when it is firm specific, i.e., it is concentrated in the areas of a firm’s 
established capabilities. Consistent with this reasoning, Henderson and Cockburn (1994) 
corroborate empirically that a firm’s cumulative success, which relies on its existing resources 
and capabilities, increases the likelihood of its future success.  
                                                 
1  The competitive dynamics in desktop printer industry may be helpful in illustrating this point. When 
Hewlett-Packard launched its first ink jet printer based on its unique thermal ink jet technology, 
competitors with different technology bases (e.g., Epson’s piezoelectric technology) were disinclined to 
follow Hewlett-Packard’s path because of their comparative disadvantage in thermal ink jet. Similarly, it 
would take other rivals who are not familiar with such technology a long time before they could imitate 
Hewlett-Packard. As a result, Hewlett-Packard led the subsequent new innovations around thermal ink jet 
technology and dominated the ink jet printer market for the following 20 years.  
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Therefore, a firm that emphasizes the accumulation and deployment of firm-specific 
knowledge is likely to yield a higher level of firm-specific knowledge resources and thus to be in 
a better position to appropriate the economic rents generated from such knowledge (Montgomery 
and Wernerfelt, 1988).  We thus have the following baseline resource-based view hypothesis: 
H1:  Firms with high levels of firm-specific knowledge resources are more likely to 
achieve higher levels of economic performance. 
 
 
Firm-Specific Knowledge Resources and Employee Governance Mechanisms 
 
Although the issue of employee willingness to invest in specific human capital is relevant 
to many firms, firms may differ substantially in terms of their need for employees to invest in 
such human capital (Williamson, 1985). Some businesses have limited opportunities for their 
employees to invest in firm-specific human capital. These firms often operate in highly 
competitive markets with nearly homogeneous products or services. Because these firms are 
unlikely to have unique technologies and resources, they are typically operated more efficiently 
by general human capital that can be readily obtained from the labor market and are equally 
available to many other firms.  Examples are firms that operate in markets with standardized 
tasks and commodity-like outputs. To operate more flexibly in performing such standard tasks, 
the firm often hires employees on short-term contracts. In contrast, firms operating in complex 
markets with intensive technology and firm-specific knowledge, which is often characterized by 
high levels of firm-specific R&D investment and specialized patent applications, have a much 
greater need for the firms’ key employees to develop firm-specific skills, for example, in terms 
of process improvement and new product development.  
Thus, the need for providing the appropriate incentives for an employee to invest in firm-
specific human capital varies with the nature of the firm’s existing stock of knowledge resources.  
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According to Williamson (1975), a transaction that includes substantial specific investments ties 
two contracting parties — in this case, the firm who owns the firm-specific knowledge assets and 
the employees who invest in specific human capital — in a bilateral monopoly relationship, as 
neither party can walk away without incurring economic losses. This bilateral monopoly 
situation creates the possibility of ex post opportunistic behavior, or the potential for holdup from 
either party, depending on who has more power at the time of bargaining (Schelling, 1960; 
Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1985).  
If contracts were available to ensure ex post that a party can obtain an acceptable amount 
of economic profits from his/her specific investment ex ante, opportunistic behavior from either 
party can be effectively insured against through the design of complete contracts. However, the 
writing of complete (contingent claims) contracts on knowledge-based resources and specific 
human capital is usually not feasible, as the investments of such assets are not fully measurable 
and the economic returns derived from the investments can not be clearly distinguished from 
those derived from other sources. Where contracts are incomplete, the problem of under-
investment arises since ex post each party will want to capture a greater share of the economic 
returns (Tirole, 1988; Hart, 1995). In the case of the current paper, employees with foresight may 
under-invest in firm-specific human capital, as they are concerned that the firm might ex post use 
its bargaining power to appropriate some or even most of the economic returns generated from 
their investments (Williamson, 1985; Shleifer and Summers, 1988).  
In addition to the potential for holdup in the process of splitting economic gains, there is 
also the chance of termination of the relationship for exogenous reasons such as environmental 
uncertainty. Although there are cases where the employee may holdup the firm by threatening to 
quit, it is more often the case that the firm initiates the separation. In other words, under bilateral 
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monopoly, the risk of economic holdup often affects employee more severely than the firm 
(Glick and Feuer, 1984). One source of the termination of the relationship by the firm is the need 
for strategic change due to changes in the firm’s operating environment. With such changes, 
certain firm-specific knowledge and its associated specific human capital that was a source of 
superior economic performance may become obsolete. For example, technological advancement, 
discoveries, and inventions can have a negative impact on the rent-generating potential of some 
co-specialized investments (Rumelt, 1984). Such external changes not only impose additional 
concern for holdup in renegotiation, but also may lead the firm to change strategy and resource 
bundles through divesture and diversification. Such strategic changes may lead to the termination 
of the current bilateral monopoly relationship, leaving the employees in a weaker bargaining 
position relative to the firm (Titman, 1984; Cornell and Shapiro, 1987). Thus, for firms with high 
levels of specific knowledge resources, it is critical to adopt appropriate governance mechanisms 
that will likely increase employees’ willingness to invest in economically valuable firm-specific 
human capital in the wealth-creating activities of firms (Wang and Barney, 2006).  
In sum, firm-specificity in a firm’s knowledge resources is a double-edged sword: on the 
one hand, firm-specific knowledge is crucial in enabling firms to gain and sustain competitive 
advantage; on the other hand, such knowledge induces the employee to have high appropriation 
concerns. Without appropriate economic incentives or some shared norms and values, employees 
will be reluctant to commit to investments in non-transferable skills, preferring instead to invest 
in more generic skills that can be applied elsewhere. Therefore, firms with a greater stock of 
firm-specific knowledge resources are more likely to adopt governance mechanisms that better 
align employees’ interests with those of the firm.  
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Ouchi (1980) indicates that cooperative behavior of employees can be achieved by virtue 
of three general mechanisms: outcome control (e.g., price or market-based economic incentives), 
behavior control (e.g., managerial monitoring), and clan socialization (e.g., shared corporate 
value), corresponding to markets, hierarchies, and clan-like organization forms respectively. The 
current paper maintains that for firms with high levels of firm-specific knowledge resources, 
behavior control or monitoring by managers may have little effect on inducing the appropriate 
employee behavior of absorbing and deploying firm-specific knowledge, because the employee's 
investments in specific human capital are often unobservable or difficult to measure. According 
to Eisenhardt (1985), such a situation represents imperfect task programmability, which weakens 
the applicability of managerial control of employee behavior in regards to making firm-specific 
human capital investment. Furthermore, unobservable employee efforts also make it unlikely that 
firms can fully regulate employee behavior by designing a compensation contract that directly 
compensates the employee for his/her effort in making an appropriate level of specific human 
capital investment.  
Thus, a firm with high knowledge specificity is left with two other general governance 
mechanisms, i.e., outcome control and socialization. Specifically, the current paper discusses two 
interrelated governance mechanisms that may enable firms to mitigate the employee’s otherwise 
justifiable reluctance in making firm-specific human capital investments: an economic-based 
governance mechanism and a relationship-based governance mechanism. We discuss these two 
general governance mechanisms below in turn. 
Economic-based governance mechanism: employee stock ownership. The economic-
based governance solution is built upon property rights theory, which maintains that an employee 
will be more willing to invest in specialized human capital if the employee is able to appropriate 
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a certain share of the economic rents generated from these investments in a fair manner. Property 
rights theory (e.g., Demsetz, 1967; Barzel, 1989; Libecap, 1989) maintains that ownership rights 
are instrumental in allocating resources toward their highest economically valued uses and thus 
these ownership rights are crucial to achieving operating efficiency. 
 A particular feature of firm-specific knowledge resources and employee human capital 
associated with these resources is the often-ambiguous nature of ownership (Coase, 1960).  In 
general, employment contracts that govern exchanges of employee services are costly to write 
and enforce (Coase, 1937; Klein, 1980). Consequently, such contracts are typically incomplete 
(Hart, 1995). These un-contracted dimensions of the exchange, which are in essence property 
rights, are the ‘residual rights of control” (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). 
When these residual rights of control do not accrue to the transactional party who has control 
over the resource, this party has lower incentive to maximize the economic rent-generating 
potential of the resources, and this lower incentive potentially induces highly self-interested 
behavior. Therefore, the residual rights or ownership of resources involved in a transaction 
should go to the transactional party whose firm-specific investments have the most influence 
over the resources and thus contribute the most to firm value but are the most difficult or 
impossible to contract over (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Specifically, 
when the key resource involved is the firm-specific knowledge, it is desirable to grant some 
equity ownership to the key employees who have to absorb and deploy such knowledge.  
Since employees’ behavior in absorbing and deploying firm-specific knowledge is highly 
difficult to observe and measure, insufficient knowledge of the transformation process or 
imperfect task programmability will force the employer to adopt outcome control — as opposed 
to behavior control — to induce cooperative efforts of employees (Ouchi, 1980; Eisenhardt, 
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1985). Linking employees’ financial reward directly to the economic value of the firm through 
granting employees equity ownership likely provides the strongest interest alignment between 
the firm and its employees (cf. Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).   
In these business circumstances, granting employee ownership or property rights is a 
feasible governance choice. Employee ownership provides both a measure of residual control 
and a measure of economic profit sharing to encourage productive efforts. Granting employees 
ownership rights directly, however, is costly to the firm. In addition to the direct reduction of the 
share of the economic profit accrued to the firm, other shareholders’ investment incentives are 
worsened, since the shareholders will gain only a fraction of the marginal product with the full 
marginal cost of their investment (Roberts and Van den Steen, 2000). Therefore, when a firm has 
a high level of firm-specific knowledge resources, where the concern for employee under-
investment is likely to be the greatest, it is more likely that the firm grants its employees 
ownership rights. Following this organizational economics logic we hypothesize that:  
H2a:  A firm’s level of firm-specific knowledge resources is positively associated with its use of 
employee stock ownership as a governance mechanism. 
 
 
Informal employee relations.   The governance of firm-employee exchanges involves an 
entire system that goes beyond employee ownership (Ouchi, 1980; Eisenhardt, 1985).  Informal 
relationships between the firm and its employees may serve as an alternative governance 
mechanism for securing employee willingness to cooperate with firm interests (Barnard, 1938; 
Selznick, 1957). Such intrinsic motivation is valued for its own sake and appears to be self-
sustained (Calder and Staw, 1975). This humanistic approach has been emphasized for decades 
in organization theory (e.g., McGregor, 1960; Likert, 1961; Argyris, 1964) and more recently in 
the literature on psychological contracts (e.g., Rousseau, 1995; Morrison and Robinson, 1997), 
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often in the form of identification with the firm’s strategic goals, shared purposes, and the 
fulfillment of norms for its own sake (Ouchi, 1980).  
 Moreover, employee stock ownership as a governance mechanism has drawbacks. For 
example, ownership may not fully safeguard against shirking behavior, because profit sharing is 
typically not fine-tuned to individual performance. This agency problem can be especially severe 
if employees need to work in a group, in which setting, it is more difficult to assess individual 
performance because contracts cannot completely specify all relevant aspects of employee 
behavior and its desired outcome (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). Contracts that offer purely 
economic incentives to reach given goals can potentially give rise to dysfunctional behavioral 
responses (Miller, 1992). Employees may focus exclusively on the rewarded aspects of the job 
and disregard the unrewarded ones.  
Therefore, socialization or “clan” control is needed when outcome measurability is low 
(Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi, 1980). Socialization can help employees to build a sense of belonging 
and to accept the firm’s goals as close to their own, thus providing employees strong interest 
alignment with the firm. The shared value embedded in well functioning informal firm-employee 
relationships will often inspire employees to self-enforce their formal contracts with the firm. 
Therefore, the establishment and enforcement of a cooperative solution (Holmstrom and 
Milgrom, 1991; Gibbons, 1998; Prendergast, 1999) in which each employee agrees to higher 
work norms may solve problems associated with group work. This agreement may be 
accomplished using organizational programs to encourage employee involvement in workplace 
decisions. New communication channels can be opened both to provide employees with more 
information and to solicit ideas from employees, and to assure workers that any productivity 
improvements will not result in layoffs or reduced job security. This agreement may substitute or 
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complement employee ownership to help create a “sense of belonging” and consequently higher 
employee commitment.  
Empirical work generally shows that relational governance is associated with greater 
employee cooperation and trust, which in turn reduces employee concerns for firm holdup and 
thus improves the performance of inter-organizational exchanges (Heide and John, 1990; Zaheer 
and Venkatraman, 1995; Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone, 1998). Yet, the development and 
maintenance of relational governance are costly because they often require substantial long-term 
firm investment in various human resource practices, including for example, recruitment, and 
training practices that facilitate employee commitment, performance appraisal that emphasize 
team production and shared values, and long-term or no layoff employment policies (e.g., 
Collins and Smith, 2006). This cost factor means that the use of relational governance is more 
beneficial when substantial hazards are present or other control mechanisms become prohibitive. 
Absent these hazards and constraints, incurring the costs of relational governance may not be 
warranted.  Therefore, we hypothesize the following: 
H2b:  A firm’s level of firm-specific knowledge resources is positively associated with the extent 
to which it places emphasis on establishing good relationships with employees. 
 
 
Interest Alignment and Specific Knowledge-based Performance Advantage 
 
 Although firm-specific knowledge resources are potential sources of the firm’s superior 
economic performance, if employee interests are not aligned with the interests of the firm, the 
actual economic performance of the firm may never reach its potential.  Therefore, both explicit 
and implicit governance mechanisms, such as employee stock ownership and firm-employee 
relationships, should be important in influencing performance advantages of firm-specific 
knowledge resources through their ability to align the interests of the firm and its employees.  
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Consistent with this view, organizational capability and motivation are recognized as the 
two fundamental drivers for firm behavior and consequentially firm-level economic performance 
(Chen, 1996; Gimeno, 1999). These two different but co-existing drivers jointly influence the 
economic outcome of the firm. Viewing these joint drivers from the Motivation-Capability logic, 
the current resource-based theory of the firm focuses mainly on the potential economic rents 
generated by firm resources — especially by firm-specific knowledge resources. What has been 
far less examined from this perspective is the willingness of employees to deploy firm-specific 
resources. Indeed, the governance of employees who actually deploy and utilize firm-level 
resources towards productive uses moderate the de facto economic rents generated by the firm.  
Therefore, in order to understand what and how superior firm-level resources are deployed to 
achieve sustainable competitive advantage, we need to simultaneously consider the firm’s 
dynamic resource base and the effectiveness of a firm’s governance system (Makadok, 2003). 
For a firm to reduce the gap between potential economic rents and realized economic 
rents, the firm needs to align employee interests with that of the firm, which if not appropriately 
managed will substantially reduce the capability for firm-specific knowledge to deliver superior 
economic performance. Hypotheses 2a and 2b suggest that an effective governance system for a 
firm that emphasizes the accumulation and deployment of firm-specific knowledge will more 
likely grant employees ownership and build informal relationship with employees.  Departure 
from such governance mechanisms will typically result in imperfectly realized economic rents. 
Thus, the current paper posits an interaction effect between firm-specific knowledge resources 
and employee governance mechanisms on firm-level economic performance. In this sense, a 
firm’s governance system is analogous to a faucet, the inappropriate function of which will 
hinder the flow of firm-specific knowledge resources towards full realization of economic rents. 
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H3a:  The relationship between the level of firm-specific knowledge resources and firm-level 
economic performance is positively moderated by employee stock ownership.  
 
H3b:  The relationship between the level of firm-specific knowledge resources and firm-level 
economic performance is positively moderated by firm-employee relationships. 
 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
Data and Sample 
 
 
We constructed the sample for this research study by compiling several main data 
sources: the Standard and Poor’s Compustat; the United States patent data; SEC EDGAR data; 
KLD Research and Analytics Inc. data; and data from the Great Place to Work Institute. Since all 
of the datasets are provided in multiple years, we are able to construct a panel dataset, based on 
the overlapping period across the datasets. This results in an unbalanced panel sample of 205 
firms and 970 firm-year observations for the period between 1994 and 1999 for our analysis. 
Since the current paper builds on the modern property rights research literature, which 
emphasizes the importance of both human capital and patenting (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001; 
Kim and Mahoney, 2005), manufacturing industries seemed to be an especially relevant 
empirical context. Thus, we began our sample selection with the group of firms in manufacturing 
industries (4-digit SIC codes from 2000 to 3999) that are also listed in the KLD Research and 
Analytics Inc. database between 1994 and 1999. The KLD data are used to construct the measure 
for firm-employee implicit relationships. KLD data are widely used in the business and society 
literature and are considered to be the best data available for a comprehensive measure of 
corporate social relationships and stakeholder management (Sharfman, 1996; Waddock and 
Graves, 1997; Hillman and Keim, 2001). Starting from 1991, KLD compiled data for firms in 
S&P 500, DSI 400 (and starting in year 2001, Russell 4000 firms are also included) in terms of 
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the issues related to community, corporate governance, diversity, firm-employee relationships, 
human rights, environment, product, alcohol, tobacco, gambling, firearms, nuclear power and 
military contracting. The profiles have social ratings evaluating each company’s strengths and 
concerns in each dimension, except for alcohol, tobacco, gambling, firearms, nuclear power and 
military contracting, in which only concerns are evaluated.  We obtain our firm-employee 
relationships measure from the “employee relations” dimension of the KLD data2.  Between 
1994 and 1999, KLD data contain information on about 650 firms on average for each year, in 
which approximately half of them are manufacturing firms.  
Information on employee stock ownership for the firms in the initial sample is collected 
manually from the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The SEC requires every 
registered firm to file a definitive proxy statement (DEF14-A) annually, which discloses the 
beneficial ownership of the firm’s common stock held in excess of 5% by individuals or 
collectives (as block-holders) as on the date of filing. In most cases there are trustees appointed 
by the employees who operated on behalf of the employees as a group.  This information is 
available in electronic forms from 1994 through 2006 in the Electronic Data-Gathering, 
Analysis, and Retrieval system (EDGAR) database of the SEC. The exact percentage of the 
ownership is coded as reported in the beneficial owners section of the DEF14-A forms. Note that 
for firms whose employees are not block holders of at least 5% of the firm’s shares this variable 
is not reported and thus is coded as zero. There are roughly 11% of the observations in our 
sample have non-zero values. According to the latest estimate of the National Center for 
Employee Ownership (NCEO, www.neco.org), about 15% to 20% of all public companies today 
adopted employee stock ownership plans. The somewhat lower percentage of non-zero values in 
                                                 
2 Detailed descriptions of the items in the firm-employee relationships dimension can be found in the 
Appendix. 
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our sample may be attributed to at least two reasons. First, firms that adopted the employee stock 
ownership plan but have a total percentage below 5% are not included in the database; second, 
the percentage has been reported to be growing over the years.  Thus, the number for our sample 
period 1994-1999 is expected to be smaller than the 15–20%, which is estimated more recently.   
The combined firm-employee relationships and employee stock ownership data are then 
merged with patent citation and S&P’s Compustat data, where we obtained our measures of 
firm-specific knowledge resources and firm economic performance measures respectively. Hall, 
Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) have created a data file that contains detailed information on 
almost three million U.S. patents granted between 1963 and 1999, and over 16 million citations 
made of these patents for those granted between 1975 and 1999.  Further, Hall, et al. (2001) 
matched the file to Compustat data, which is available for download from the website of the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Because our unit of analysis is the firm, we 
aggregated the patents and their citation counts to the firm level (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). 
Finally, data on the 100 best companies to work for from the Great Place to Work Institute is 
added to the sample to obtain an alternative measure of firm-employee relationship3. Since this 
variable is coded as a dummy, which is 1 if a firm is in the list in a certain year, and 0 otherwise, 
adding this dataset does not affect the sample size.   
                                                 
 
3 The “100 best companies to work for” list was not available in each consecutive year until 1998. Before 
1998, the lists were available only for 1984 and 1993. To overcome this constraint, we used data from the 
most adjacent year to substitute for missing information for the years 1994-1997. In particular, we 
substituted the missing information in years 1994 and 1995 with the 1993 list; and for the years 1996 and 
1997, we used the 1998 list. This approach is justified for the following two reasons. First, the list 
demonstrates some stability over time, i.e., the majority of the 100 firms included in the list in one year 
remain in the list in the next year. Second, we have run alternative tests for 1998 and 1999 only, for which 
the lists of companies are available and found that the results are largely consistent with those based on 
the substitution approach. To maintain consistency with the remainder of the analysis, we report the 
results based on the substitution approach that enables us to cover the full sample from 1994 to 1999. 
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After merging all the datasets and deleting observations with missing values in our key 
variables, the final panel data include 205 firms and 970 firm-year observations between 1994 
and 1999. The firms are distributed within 17 two-digit and 63 three-digit SIC codes.   
 
Measures 
 
Firm economic performance (Tobin’s Q).  Tobin’s Q was employed to capture the 
economic performance of the firm as Tobin’s Q reflects the stock market’s expectations of the 
future growth and profitability potential of the firm.  Tobin’s Q is approximated as the market-to-
book ratio. Specifically, the market value numerator is the year-end market value of common 
stock plus the book value of preferred stock and debt, and the book value denominator is the 
year-end total asset.  This measure is in line with our statistical model, which will be explained 
later on.  Meanwhile, this measure explains over 96% of the variance in a more sophisticated 
Tobin’s Q ratio that would require arbitrary assumptions about depreciation and inflation rates 
for the calculation of assets’ replacement values (e.g., Lindenberg and Ross, 1981).  In addition, 
to be consistent with our statistical model, which shall be discussed in the next section, we 
conducted a log transformation of our proxy of Tobin’s Q. 
Firm-specificity of knowledge resources (FS).  Patent citations provide direct evidence 
of the path of knowledge flow and knowledge spillovers, since each technological innovation 
explicitly identifies several others as constituting the state-of-the-art technology on which it 
builds. Each patent has backward citations, like the references in a scientific paper. It is therefore 
possible to tabulate the frequency with which a particular patent cites previous patents of the 
same firm vis-à-vis other firms. Some research has used such tabulations to explore questions 
involving spatial spillovers (Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson, 1993), international knowledge 
flows (Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 1999), and spillovers from public research (Jaffe and Lerner 1999).  
 22
As having been argued earlier, firm-specific knowledge often results from firms’ 
searching and accumulating new knowledge on the basis of their established knowledge base 
(Teece 1986, Cohen and Levinthal 1989). If patents represent knowledge creation, and patent 
citations represent knowledge flows, the frequency with which a firm cites its own previous 
patents will indicate the degree to which the innovative knowledge is built upon the firm's own 
existing knowledge base, which then reflects the level of firm-specificity of the firm’s 
knowledge resources. The higher the degree of internal private knowledge accumulation, the 
more firm-specific is the firm’s innovative knowledge. Based on this premise, measures of firm-
specific knowledge resources may be constructed using patent citations.  The level of firm-
specific knowledge resources thus can be measured by examining the extent to which a firm’s 
current knowledge is derived from knowledge previously existing within the firm (cf. Hoetker 
and Agarwal, in press).  Based on patent citation data from 1975 to 1999, we generate two 
proxies of the level of firm-specific knowledge resources: (1) the share of citations which are 
self-cites, and (2) the average number of self-cites scaled by firm size. In particular, the first 
measure of the level of firm-specific knowledge is calculated by counting the aggregate number 
of patent citations made in a firm’s new patents in a certain year that cited the firm’s previous 
patents, and then dividing this by the total patent citations made in all of the firm’s new patents 
in that year. As for the second measure, the level of firm-specific knowledge is calculated using 
the total number of self-cites within a certain year divided by the total firm assets in a firm in that 
year.   
Note that the firm-specific knowledge measure using shares of self-cites explicitly takes 
into consideration the extent to which a firm’s knowledge is valued by the firm itself relative to 
other firms. However, one possible drawback of this measure is that some firms might cite their 
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own patents even when they are not economically valuable. Therefore, the share-based firm-
specificity measures may be biased toward firms holding only a few patents, which almost no 
one else cites. Nevertheless, in addition to an alternative measure of firm-specific knowledge that 
helps to mitigate this concern, potential bias is further reduced by a control variable included in 
the analysis: patenting intensity, which is measured based on the total number of firm patents in 
a given year. 
Firm-employee relationships. Two measures of firm-employee relationships are 
constructed. The first measure is based on the ‘employee relations’ dimension from KLD data. 
The employee relations dimension has a total of 7 strengths (strong union relations, no layoff 
policy, cash profit sharing, employee involvement, strong retirement benefits, health and safety 
strength, and other strengths) and 3 concerns (poor union relations, health and safety concern, 
workforce reduction) in the index. Considered as one of the best data sources for corporate social 
performance to date, KLD data have been applied by many recent studies to measure a firm’s 
social performance (e.g., Agle, Mitchell, and Sonnenfeld, 1999; Berman et al., 1999; Hillman 
and Keim, 2001). Following these research studies, we subtract the total number of concerns 
from the total number of strengths to arrive at a net score for firm-employee relationships. For 
example, if a firm hypothetically gets two “strengths” for no layoff policy and retirement 
benefits, plus one “concern” for workforce reductions, the firm’s net score for the firm-employee 
relationships dimension will be 1 (i.e., two strengths minus one concern). Note that we excluded 
the “cash profit sharing” and “employee involvement” dimensions from the list, as they are 
relevant for financial-based governance mechanisms. In addition, the strength and concern 
associated with “union relations” are also removed as this dimension is geared toward lower 
level employees, while the current paper’s focus is on key knowledge workers.  
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The second measure of firm-employee relationships is a simple dummy variable based on 
data on the 100 best companies to work for. This measure may better capture our construct 
because, according to Great Place to Work Institute, the organization that compiled the data, the 
definition of “a great place to work” is a place where employees: "trust the people they work for, 
have pride in what they do, and enjoy the people they work with."  A great workplace is 
measured by the quality of the three interconnected relationships that exist there: (1) The 
relationship between employees and management; (2) The relationship between employees and 
their jobs/company; and (3) The relationship between employees and other employees. The 
measure is thus a dummy variable that is coded as 1 if a firm in our sample is on the top 100 best 
companies list and 0 otherwise.   
Employee stock ownership.  Employee stock ownership is measured by the percentage of 
beneficial ownership of the firm’s common stock held by employees as a collective4. Data on 
this variable are obtained from the EDGAR database of the SEC. 
Other variables. R&D expenditure is traditionally used as a measure of investment in 
technological know-how. Previous research studies (e.g., Hall, 2000; Hall, Jaffe, and 
Trajtenberg, 2005) have also considered R&D expenditure as an innovation input and an 
important determinant of the intangible component of market value. R&D expenditure is 
expected to positively contribute to Tobin’s Q. We, thus, control for the effects of R&D 
expenditure in the market value equation. Specifically, to be consistent with our statistical model, 
we scale the firm’s yearly R&D expenditure by the firm’s total assets (RD/A) in the analysis. 
                                                 
4 Because the relatively large number of zeros in this variable, we conducted a supplementary analysis by 
coding employee stock ownership as a dummy variable (those having employee ownership of 5% or 
above are coded as 1, otherwise, 0). In addition, we also constructed a third measure of employee stock 
ownership using the coding of “cash profit sharing” in ‘employee relations’ dimension from KLD data. 
The main empirical results from these alternative approaches are quite consistent with our existing 
empirical findings. Details of the alternative empirical results are available from the authors upon request.  
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A firm’s patents are considered the output of the firm’s investment in knowledge creation 
and innovative activities (e.g., Griliches, 1981; Hall, 2000; Hall et al., 2005). Therefore, 
patenting intensity represents another important component of a firm’s intangible resources that 
contribute to the firm’s market value. Patenting intensity is simply calculated by the aggregated 
number of patents in a firm over the firm’s total assets in a given year (PAT/A). 
R&D and patenting intensities are also included in the equations with employee stock 
ownership and firm-employee relationships as dependent variables. It is reasonable to expect that 
firms with greater knowledge resources in general (as indicated by R&D expenditure and 
patenting activities) have greater difficulty measuring employee efforts and are thus more likely 
to adopt employee stock ownership plans or to engage in building firm-employee relationships. 
In addition, we control for the effects of firm size and financial slack in these two equations.  
Previous research studies (e.g., Gregg and Machin, 1988; Kruse, 1996) have found empirically 
that larger companies have a greater level of employee stock ownership. Firm size may also 
affect firm-employee relationships positively, due to the presence of economies of scale in 
engaging in relationship building activities.  Financial slack has been argued to affect the extent 
to which a firm adopts employee stock ownership plans (Poole and Jenkins, 1990; Jones and 
Kato, 1993) and firms with greater slack are more likely to engage in activities that build up their 
relationships with various stakeholders, including employees (Waddock and Graves, 1997).  
Firm size is proxied by the natural logarithm of the total number of employees in a firm, 
given the evident positive skewness in this variable. Using the number of employees instead of 
total assets or sales to proxy for firm size fits better with this study, given employees’ 
willingness in making firm-specific human capital investments as the focus of our analysis. 
Following the methods of previous studies by Bourgeois (1981) and Singh (1986), we use each 
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firm’s current ratios (current assets divided by current liabilities) to represent available firm 
financial slack. In addition, year dummies and industry dummies at a three-digit SIC level are 
incorporated in all equations to control for time and industry fixed effects. 
Estimation Method 
 
Overall model. Our hypotheses require that we empirically test a system of equations 
simultaneously, since both employee stock ownership and firm-employee relationships are 
endogenously determined.  First, we need to test whether the level of firm-specific knowledge 
resources is associated with the degree of employee stock ownership; second and 
simultaneously, we test whether the level of firm-specific knowledge resources is associated with 
the use of implicit firm-employee relationships; third, we must examine whether the level of 
firm-specific knowledge resources affects firm-level performance and whether the relationship 
between firm-specific knowledge resources and firm performance is moderated by employee 
stock ownership and firm-employee relationships. Specifying and testing the third equation 
independently would introduce significantly biased estimates due to the endogeneity of 
employee stock ownership and firm-employee relationships variables. 
The equations are tested using a series of two-stage models that take into consideration of 
the endogeneity of the governance mechanisms. For the equations with employee ownership and 
firm-employee relationships as a continuous measure using KLD data, we apply a two-stage least 
squares method (2SLS) (Greene, 1997). In the first stage of 2SLS, new dependent or endogenous 
variables (in this case, employee stock ownership and firm-employee relationships) are created 
to substitute for the original ones. In the second stage, the regression is computed in the usual 
(OLS) fashion, but regressing on the newly created variable(s). The purpose of the first stage, in 
addition to the tests of equations 1 and 2, is thus to create new variables that reduce the biases 
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caused by the endogeneity in the variables in equation 3.  Thus in this empirical study, the 2SLS 
estimation consists of two stages and the test of three equations. The first stage tests equations 1 
and 2, which have employee stock ownership and firm-employee relationship respectively as the 
dependent variables. New variables are obtained by regressing the first-stage models. The second 
stage empirically tests equation 3, which has firm-level economic performance (market value) as 
the dependent variable, uses the newly estimated employee stock ownership, firm-employee 
relationships and their interactions with other factors that affect market value as regressors.  
However, since our second measure of firm-employee relationships is a dummy variable, 
we apply Heckman’s (1979) self-selection model for equations with the dummy measure of firm-
employee relationships. Although both 2SLS and Heckman’s self-selection techniques address 
the endogeneity of explanatory variables using two-stage models, one of the notable differences 
between these two techniques resides in the nature of the first-stage dependent variable. In 2SLS, 
the first-stage dependent variable is generally continuous. Heckman’s self-selection technique, 
on the other hand, is more appropriate for estimating models with discrete (choice) first-stage 
dependent variables.  
As stated in the measures section, in addition to the level of firm-specific knowledge 
resources, R&D, patenting intensities, firm size, and financial slack are also included in the first-
stage equations.  Industry and year dummies are included to account for the differences across 
these dimensions.  
The second-stage performance equation. Following the pioneering work of Waugh 
(1928) and Griliches (1961), and many later studies (e.g., Griliches, 1981; Hall, 2000; Hall et al., 
2005), we determined the economic returns on firm-specific knowledge resources using the 
hedonic regression method which generally regresses the market value of a firm on the bundles 
 28
of resources that compose the firm, including measures relating to intangible resources such as 
knowledge and innovations.  This research approach is often used when the direct valuation of 
the economic value generated from a resource is not available, and the resource can only be 
valued when bundled with other resources of the firm.  For example, it is not easy to separate the 
knowledge about how to generate an innovation from the other resources of the firm that convert 
this innovation into a marketable product (Hall, 2000). However, assuming that the financial 
market is reasonably efficient in evaluating the total economic value of a firm (through stock 
price), we can use the hedonic regression method to infer the economic rents of an intangible 
resource from its regression coefficient estimate.  
We therefore followed the basic approach employed in the market valuation literature 
that relates the market value of the company to the economic value of its tangible assets and 
various measures of its intangible assets (Griliches, 1981; Hall, 2000).  is defined as the 
market value of company i . The assets of the firm are made up of two parts: physical or tangible 
assets which are recorded and are measured as part of the total assets of the firm; and knowledge 
or intangible assets which largely go unrecorded and do not appear in the accounts as part of the 
total assets. The recorded economic value of the tangible assets is defined as , and the 
corresponding measures of the economic value of the intangible assets are defined as . The 
model is thus represented by: 
iMV
iA
iK
σγ )( iii KAqMV +=      (1) 
Taking the logarithms of both sides,  
)/1log(logloglog iiii AKAqMV γσσ +++=    (2) 
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where )/1log( ii AKγ+ is generally approximated by ii AK /γ in the literature (Hall et al., 2005). 
γ  measures the shadow value of knowledge assets relative to the tangible assets of the firm.σ is 
unity under constant returns to scale, which is expected to be the case in a cross-sectional setting. 
, the log of book assets, can then be moved to the left side of the equation: iAlog
iiii AKqAMV /log)log( γ+= .    (3) 
As Tobin’s Q is defined as a firm’s market value to the replacement value of the firm’s 
assets, and the replacement value is approximately the value of the tangible assets of the firm, 
ii AMV , the ratio of a firm’s market value to the value of its tangible assets is in fact Tobin’s Q. 
Therefore, the above equation can be estimated with the logarithm of the conventional Tobin’s Q 
( ) as the dependent variable, as we did here. Therefore, our final estimation model can be 
represented as follows: 
iQ
iiii AKqQ εγ ++= /loglog      (4) 
where iε  is a normally distributed error term. 
On the basis of the model shown above, we came up with its expanded version:  
nershipEmployeeOwFSFSAPATARDQ *//log 23210 γβββα ++++=  
     εηγ +++ XlationsEmployeeFS Re*3           (5) 
Thus, equation (5) is the final second-stage equation to be estimated in this study. The β  
parameters refer to intangible assets including both general and firm-specific knowledge assets: 
the ratio of R&D to total assets ( 1β ), the ratio of patent counts to total assets ( 2β ), and the level 
of firm-specific knowledge assets ( 3β ). The γ parameters refer to the variables hypothesized to 
affect market value through providing motivations for employees to cooperate with the firm, 
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including interactions of the level of firm-specific knowledge assets with employee stock 
ownership (γ2) and firm-employee relationships ( 3γ ).  
The constant term 0α  can be interpreted as the log of Tobin’s Q when the other variables 
in the equation are zero. X encompasses other possible factors that may affect the value of 
intangible assets and Tobin’s Q. In the analysis, time and industry fixed effects are included to 
control for differences across industries and over time, as a firm’s market value is expected to 
vary across these dimensions.   
 To address the concern on autocorrelation and unobserved heterogeneity that are likely 
to be present when estimating a panel data set, we further apply standard techniques for panel 
data analysis. A Hausman (1978) test is conducted to determine the appropriate estimation 
method. The test results demonstrate that significant correlations exist between the error and the 
regressors, suggesting that firm-fixed effects models are preferred over random effects for our 
statistical analysis. Therefore, we have applied 2SLS with fixed effects to test the models. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics and correlation matrices for the main variables used 
in the study. The two measures of the level of firm-specific knowledge resources (share of self-
citations made and number of self-citations made) are highly correlated with each other 
(correlation = .42). In addition, both measures are positively correlated with market value, or 
logged Tobin’s Q. Also consistent with our expectations, both firm-specific knowledge measures 
have largely positive and statistically significant correlations with the two employee governance 
mechanisms: “employee stock ownership” and both measures of “firm-employee relationships” 
(except for the correlation between number of self-cites and employee stock ownership, which is 
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statistically insignificant, although the sign is still positive). R&D and patenting intensities are 
also positively correlated with logged Tobin’s Q, as would be expected.     
 
--------------------------- Insert Table 1 about here --------------------------- 
 
 
Table 2 shows the empirical results of the first stage models, which include regressions of 
employee stock ownership and both measures of firm-employee relationships against factors 
thought to affect the extent to which a firm adopts the employee governance mechanisms. 
Models 1, 3, 5, and 7 use the share of self-cites as the measure of the level of firm-specific 
knowledge; models 2, 4, 6, and 8, on the other hand, use number of self-cites as the firm-specific 
knowledge measure.  
 
--------------------------- Insert Table 2 about here --------------------------- 
 
 
The results from the first-stage analysis are largely consistent with the prediction of 
hypotheses 2a and 2b, which indicate that firms with a high level of firm-specific knowledge 
resources are more likely to adopt appropriate governance mechanisms to align employees’ 
efforts with that of the firm.  Employee stock ownership is found to be positively associated with 
the level of firm-specific knowledge resources when measured by the share of self-cites (Models 
1 and 3, p < .05). The relationship becomes statistically insignificant when the number of self-
cites is used for the firm-specific knowledge measure; but the sign maintains positive (Models 2 
and 4). More consistent patterns are found in the equation with firm-employee relationships as 
the dependent variables. When the continuous measure of the variable (based on KLD data) is 
used, the coefficients on both measures of firm-specific knowledge resources are positive and 
statistically significant (Models 5 and 6, p < .01 and p < .001 respectively). The effects are 
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weaker when the dummy variable measure of firm-employee relationship is used; but they are 
still at least marginally significant (Model 7 and 8, p < .05 and p < .1 respectively). Therefore, 
we find some support for hypothesis 2a and strong support for hypothesis 2b, providing 
empirical evidence for our argument of the endogeneity of employee governance mechanisms. 
The results shown in Table 2 also indicate that employee stock ownership and firm-
employee relationships (especially with the continuous measure of firm-employee relationships) 
are negatively associated with each other, indicating that these two governance mechanisms are 
likely to be substitutive. Furthermore, large firms are found to be more likely to have a high level 
of employee stock ownership. Financial slack is positively associated with firm-employee 
relationships, consistent with the perspective that cash rich firms are more likely to engage in 
activities that build up their relationships with employees (e.g., Waddock and Graves, 1997). But 
the same effect is not found when employee stock ownership is used as the dependent variable. 
Similarly, consistent with our prediction, R&D intensity is positively related to firm-employee 
relationships; but the effect is not statistically significant for employee stock ownership.  
 
Second-stage Financial Performance Estimates 
 
Table 3 presents the empirical results from the second-stage estimation of the models. For 
the models applying 2SLS (Models 2, 3, 6, and 7), we use the estimated employee stock 
ownership and firm-employee relationships variables generated in the first stage and their 
interactions with other factors that affect market value as regressors. For the models applying the 
Heckman’s self-selection model (Models 4 and 8), we add the correction for self-selection 
(inverse Mills ratio or Lambda) in the equations. Models 1 to 4 use the share of self-cites as the 
firm-specific knowledge measure; and models 5 to 8 use the number of self-cites as the firm-
specific knowledge measure.  
 33
 
--------------------------- Insert Table 3 about here --------------------------- 
 
 
 The effects of the key regressor, the level of firm-specific knowledge, and other 
intangible resources, including R&D and patenting intensities, are shown in Models 1 and 5. 
Both of the firm-specific knowledge measures show positive and statistically significant 
associations with market value, indicating that firms with a higher level of firm-specific 
knowledge assets are more likely to achieve a higher level of economic performance. Therefore, 
hypothesis 1 is supported. Also as predicted, both R&D and patenting intensities are positively 
and significantly (p < .001) related to firm market value (log (Tobin’s q)). 
    In Models 2 and 6, employee stock ownership and its interactions with measures for the 
level of firm-specific knowledge assets are added. When the share of self-cites is used as the 
firm-specific knowledge measure, the interaction term is positively related to firm market value 
(p < 0.05, Model 2).  When the number of self-cites is used, the coefficient on the interaction 
becomes statistically insignificant, although the sign is still positive (Model 6).  These results 
provide only limited support for hypothesis 3a, which states that the effect of firm-specific 
knowledge assets on firm performance is positively moderated by employee stock ownership.  
To gain a better understanding of the moderating role of employee stock ownership on 
the relationship between firm-specific knowledge assets and firm market value, we conducted 
supplementary analysis by splitting the sample into two sub-samples according to firm size (with 
the mean firm size, or number of employees, as the cutoff point) and running the regressions 
again using employee stock ownership as a moderator. The rationale for conducting this 
supplementary analysis is as follows. One of the drawbacks of group incentive schemes such as 
employee stock ownership is that the connection between individual performance and reward 
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grows weaker as the number of employees in the group grows larger. This drawback is 
sometimes referred to as the “1/N problem”: with N employees in a company, each employee 
will get an average only 1/N of any extra surplus generated by his/her better performance 
(Holmstrom, 1982).  Furthermore, when a firm or a team is large, the contribution of a particular 
employee to team output cannot be measured and paid accordingly. This perspective suggests 
that the link between firm-specific knowledge assets and firm economic performance may be 
stronger for smaller firms. With the reduced small firm sample, we found support for this view: 
the coefficients on the interaction terms turn positive and statistically significant for both 
measures of firm-specific knowledge assets5.  The detailed empirical results from the small firm 
sample are shown in Table 4.  
 
--------------------------- Insert Table 4 about here -------------------------- 
 
 
Models 3 and 7 in Table 3 provide the results after adding the continuous measure of 
firm-employee relationships and its interaction with measures of firm-specific knowledge assets 
to Models 1 and 5. For both firm-specific knowledge measures, the coefficients on the 
interaction terms are positive and significant (p < .001).  Models 4 and 8 replace the firm-
employee relationships measure with the dummy variable. For both firm-specific knowledge 
measures, the coefficients on the interaction terms remain positive and marginally significant    
(p < .1). These results suggest that the effect of firm-specific knowledge assets on firm 
performance is positively moderated by firm-employee relationships, supporting hypothesis 3b. 
                                                 
5 We conducted additional analysis using large firms only and found that the interaction terms are 
insignificant. Moreover, as an alternative supplementary test, instead of splitting the sample based on firm 
size, we conducted three-way interaction among employee stock ownership, knowledge specificity, and 
firm size. We found that the three-way interaction term is negative and statistically significant, a result 
consistent with that of using the split samples. These empirical results are available upon request. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The resource-base view emphasizes the role of firm-specific resources, especially firm-
specific knowledge assets, for enabling a firm to achieve superior economic performance 
(Barney, 1991; Kogut and Zander, 1992). However, little research attention6 has explored the 
governance mechanisms that may influence the actual economic benefit that can be obtained 
from firm-specific resources. This paper maintains that the features of firm-specific knowledge 
resources that constitute potential performance advantages are simultaneously likely to give rise 
justifiably to employee reluctance to invest in firm-specific human capital. And moreover, 
adopting governance mechanisms that align employee interests with that of the firm enables the 
firm to achieve a greater level of economic performance from its efforts to deploy firm-specific 
knowledge assets by virtue of reducing the gap between potential and realized economic rents.  
The key results from the current paper’s empirical analysis broadly support the theory 
developed herein. The empirical findings indicate that firms with a greater level of firm-specific 
knowledge resources are more likely to adopt appropriate governance mechanisms to align 
employees’ interests with that of the firm. The specific governance mechanisms discussed in the 
current paper include both an economic-based governance mechanism of granting employee 
stock ownership, and a relationship-based governance mechanism of building firm-employee 
relationships. Furthermore, the increased use of these governance mechanisms strengthens the 
relationship between the level of firm-specific knowledge and a firm’s economic performance. 
Therefore, this paper extends the resource-based view of the firm by emphasizing that the firm’s 
dynamic resource base and the effectiveness of its governance mechanisms jointly influence the 
firm’s actual generation of economic rents. 
                                                 
6 Exceptions are Gottschlag and Zollo (in press) and Makadok (2003), which maintain that accurately 
predicting firm performance requires that resource-based research not overlook governance mechanisms.   
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 In addition to its contribution to theory, this paper is, to our knowledge, the first empirical 
effort following the tradition of the resource- or knowledge-based view to test the antecedents of 
both explicit and implicit employee governance mechanisms and their roles in affecting firms’ 
knowledge-based advantages. Furthermore, this paper makes contributions to the research 
literature that examines the organizational consequences, especially the economic performance 
effect, of adopting employee stock ownership. While quite a few research studies have examined 
the relationship between employee stock ownership and performance, the overall empirical 
evidence is inconclusive (Kruse and Blasi, 1997). Moreover, there is little information on the 
mechanisms through which employee stock ownership may influence performance.  Although 
the inconclusiveness in the empirical results might be attributed to differences across data, 
measurements, sampling and statistical methods, the current paper’s analysis suggests another 
possibility: because employee stock ownership is endogenous to firms’ asset composition, 
whether and to what extent a firm benefits from employee ownership is also determined by the 
fit between this governance mechanism and firm’s resource compositions.    
 
Limitations and Future Research Direction 
 
This paper also has some limitations that require future research to advance its key 
arguments. First, since this paper follows an equilibrium approach of the resource-based view by 
viewing firms as a bundle of idiosyncratic knowledge resources, by design it is not able to 
address how the heterogeneity of firm-specific knowledge across firms is created in the first 
place.  Future research can fill this gap in the literature by take a dynamic and process focused 
approach to explore the origin of firm-specific knowledge creation and moreover, the employee 
governance issues in the entrepreneurial process of knowledge creation.  
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Second, although the interrelationship between the two alternative governance 
mechanisms is not the focus of the current paper, the empirical results provide evidence for both 
substitutive and complementary effects. Although directly regressing one governance mechanism 
on the other seems to suggest that employee stock ownership and firm-employee relationships 
are substitutive (Table 2), the difference in the determinants of the two governance mechanisms 
suggests some degree of complementarity.  The complementarity aspect might come from the 
failure of employee stock ownership to safeguard against employee underinvestment problem 
when individual performance is difficult to identify.  In this setting, informal relationships may 
serve as a complementary governance mechanism to employee stock ownership in resolving the 
employee underinvestment problem (Ouchi, 1980; Eisenhardt, 1985; Gibbons, 1998). However, 
without more careful empirical design and data collection, these arguments will merely remain as 
plausible speculations. Therefore, future research will make valuable contributions to the 
management research literature by carefully examining the inter-relationships between firms’ 
explicit and implicit governance mechanisms7.   
Third, the current paper may suffer from some drawbacks that stem from data limitations. 
For example, although the richness of KLD data renders it an appropriate choice for information 
on “firm-employee relationships,” the dataset still has its limitations. Specifically, the types of 
employees that the current paper focuses on are the firm’s key employees who invest in firm-
specific human capital. But the items listed in the “Employee Relations” dimension of the KLD 
data are relevant for a broader range of employees, including lower level employees. Although 
we have removed some items that are specially related to low-level employees and furthermore, 
applied an alternative measure of firm-employee relationship, it does not resolve all of the 
                                                 
7 An examplar is Poppo and Zenger’s (2002) research, which specifically examines whether formal 
contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or complements. 
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concerns. Similarly, employee stock ownership may be targeted to various levels of employees, 
including lower level employees. Although some previous empirical studies have shown that 
important employees are likely to have greater stock ownership (Brickley and Hevert, 1991) and 
that knowledge-intensive firms have greater employee ownership (Ryan and Wiggins, 2002; 
Chen and Huang, 2006), data on the specific shareholding of key knowledge workers would 
enhance the validity of the empirical findings.  
Furthermore, although patent data provided rich information about technological 
knowledge flow, it also has inherent limitations that might constrain our measurement of firm-
specific knowledge assets and thus the interpretation of regression results. Future research can 
use survey or field data to explore knowledge flow and the degree of firm-specificity in other 
aspects of knowledge assets, for example, in R&D investments (Helfat, 1994) or in other non-
patented knowledge assets. The exploration of the role of firm-specific knowledge assets can be 
even extended to firm-specificity in heterogeneous knowledge-creation processes. For example, 
the superior economic performance of a firm may not come from firm-specificity in their 
innovative output, but in the firm’s unique configurational capability for continuously generating 
new knowledge innovations ahead of their competitors.  
The resource-based view places human resources among the most important resources 
available to a firm, and central to the debate about how firms achieve competitive advantage 
(Coff, 1999; Mahoney, 2005). Therefore, the willingness of a firm’s employees to invest in 
essential firm-specific knowledge should be an important area of study in the evolving science of 
organization. It is hoped that this research constitutes another step toward a better understanding 
of the effect of employee knowledge and learning on firm behavior and performance at the 
strategic level.  
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Figure 1: The Conceptual Model 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix
 
Variables Mean s. d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
   1.   log (Tobin’s q) 0.74 0.51          
Firm-Specific Knowledge Resources            
     2.   Share of self-cites 0.12 0.11  .15*         
     3.   Number of self-cites ( x 10-3) 0.02 0.04  .08*  .42*        
   4.   Employee stock ownership 1.15 3.78  .01  .08*  .03       
   5.   Firm-employee relationships (KLD) 0.12 0.91  .17*  .19*  .20* -.09*      
   6.   Firm-employee relationships (Dummy) 0.06 0.06  .23*  .13*  .22*  .04  .38*     
   7.   R&D intensity 0.04 0.04  .37*  .11*  .14* -.05  .18*  .25*    
   8.   Patenting intensity  0.07 0.15  .15*  .23*  .24*  .04  .15*  .16*  .24*   
   9.   Firm size 8.27 1.35 -.01  .17*  .28*  .13*  .09*  .03 -.07  .36*  
  10.   Financial slack 0.03 0.08  .37*  .03 -.02 -.01 .15* .19*  .07 -.05 -.07 
 
N = 970; 
* p < .05; 
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Table 2 
The Determinants of Employee stock ownership and Firm-employee relationships:  
Results from First-Stage Models with Firm Fixed Effect
 
 
Labels 
 
DV: Employee stock  
ownership 
 
DV: Firm-employee 
relationships 
(KLD) 
DV: Firm-employee 
relationships 
(Dummy) 
Probit Models  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model6 Model 7 Model 8 
Firm-specific knowledge 
resources 
        
   Share of self-cites 3.01* 
(1.36) 
 3.05* 
(1.35) 
 2.36** 
(0.36) 
 0.23* 
(0.11) 
 
   Number of self-cites 
(x10-3) 
 0.12
(0.85) 
 0.09
(0.83) 
 0.95*** 
(0.22) 
 0.15+ 
(0.08) 
Employee stock 
ownership 
    -0.03**
(0.01) 
-0.03**
(0.01) 
-0.10 
(0.07) 
-0.10 
(0.07) 
Firm-employee 
relationships (KLD) 
-0.39** 
(0.13) 
-0.35** 
(0.13) 
      
Firm-employee 
relationships (Dummy) 
  -0.02* 
(0.01) 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
    
R&D intensity 1.49 
(3.79) 
1.21 
(3.81) 
1.77 
(3.80) 
1.39 
(3.80) 
2.95** 
(0.98) 
2.97** 
(0.99) 
0.45+ 
(0.25) 
0.48+ 
(0.25) 
Patenting intensity 2.29 
(6.66) 
0.56 
(6.82) 
3.16 
(6.54) 
0.39 
(6.77) 
1.33 
(2.17) 
1.27 
(2.21) 
0.19 
(0.35) 
0.18 
(0.41) 
Firm size 0.37** 
(0.12) 
0.41*** 
(0.12) 
0.36** 
(0.12) 
0.41*** 
(0.12) 
0.06+ 
(0.03) 
0.06+ 
(0.03) 
0.03
(0.04) 
0.04
(0.04) 
Financial slack 0.75 
(1.80) 
0.85 
(1.80) 
0.69 
(1.81) 
0.78 
(1.81) 
1.47** 
(0.50) 
1.56*** 
(0.50) 
0.15*** 
(0.03) 
0.20*** 
(0.03) 
R2  0.45 0.44 0.43 0.40  0.49  0.50   
LL(L  Likelihood) og       -1309.3 -1321.6     
   N = 970;  
   Standard errors are shown in parentheses;  
   Industry and year dummies are included but not reported;
    Significant at the + p < .10  * p < .05  ** p < .01  ***  p < .001 level. 
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Table 3 
The Determinants of Firm Market Value (DV: log (Tobin’s q)) 
Results from Second-Stage Models with Firm Fixed Effect 
(Equation 3) 
 
Labels Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 Base 2SLS 2SLS Self-
Selection 
Base 2SLS 2SLS Self-
Selection 
R&D intensity 4.68*** 
(0.41) 
4.85*** 
(0.41) 
4.58*** 
(0.41) 
4.55*** 
(0.41) 
5.15*** 
(0.42) 
5.13*** 
(0.42) 
5.08*** 
(0.42) 
5.02*** 
(0.43) 
Patenting intensity 2.91*** 
(0.70) 
2.87*** 
(0.70) 
2.96*** 
(0.69) 
2.74*** 
(0.69) 
3.18*** 
(0.71) 
3.15*** 
(0.71) 
3.23*** 
(0.71) 
3.25*** 
(0.72) 
Firm-specific knowledge resources         
   Share of self-cites 0.50*** 
(0.15) 
0.47** 
(0.15) 
0.58*** 
(0.15) 
0.52*** 
(0.15) 
    
   Number of self-cites (x10-3)     0.83* 
(0.41) 
0.85* 
(0.42) 
1.58** 
(0.59) 
1.56** 
(0.57) 
Employee stock ownership (ESO)  0.00 
(0.00) 
   0.00 
(0.00) 
  
ESO * Firm-specific knowledge   0.08* 
(0.04) 
   0.11 
(0.10) 
  
Firm-employee relationships 
(KLD) (ER1) 
  0.05*** 
(0.01) 
   0.05*** 
(0.01) 
 
ER1 * Firm-specific knowledge    0.35*** 
(0.11) 
   0.91** 
(0.30) 
 
Firm-employee relationships 
(Dummy) (ER2) 
   0.12* 
(0.05) 
   0.06*** 
(0.01) 
ER2 * Firm-specific knowledge     0.71+ 
(0.37) 
   0.93+ 
(0.48) 
Inverse Mills Ratio (Lambda)    0.12* 
(0.05) 
   0.12* 
(0.05) 
R2 0.71 0.72 0.74 0.74 0.71 0.71 0.73 0.72 
∆R2 (vs. Models 1 & 5)  0.01 0.03 0.03  0.00 0.02 0.01 
   
 N = 970;  
   Standard errors are shown in parentheses; 
   Industry and year dummies are included but not reported; 
    Significant at the + p < .10  * p < .05  ** p < .01  ***  p < .001 level. 
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Table 4 
 
Reexamining the Moderating Role of Employee Stock Ownership for Small Firms  
(with Firm Fixed Effect) 
 
 
Labels  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
R&D intensity 4.24*** 
(0.55) 
4.18*** 
(0.56) 
4.17*** 
(0.56) 
3.98*** 
(0.55) 
Patenting intensity 2.83*** 
(0.75) 
2.85*** 
(0.75) 
2.57** 
(0.74) 
2.70** 
(0.74) 
Firm-specific knowledge resources     
   Share of self-cites  1.03*** 
(0.25) 
1.01*** 
(0.25) 
  
   Number of self-cites (x10-3)   0.42** 
(0.15) 
0.57** 
(0.21) 
Employee stock ownership (ESO)  0.01 
(0.00) 
 0.01 
(0.01) 
ESO * Firm-specific Knowledge  0.12* 
(0.05) 
 0.62*** 
(0.16) 
R2 0.64 0.65 0.63 0.65 
∆R2  0.01  0.02 
    
   N = 482;  
Standard errors are shown in parentheses;  
Industry and year dummies are included but not reported; 
Significant at the + p < .10  * p < .05  ** p < .01  ***  p < .001 level; 
The sample includes firms with size below the mean level; and size is measured by the log of the 
number of employees. 
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Appendix 
 
The categories in the “Employee Relations” dimension of the KLD dataset 
 
STRENGTHS 
 
Strong Union Relations (EMP-str-A): The Company has a history of notably strong union 
relations. 
No-Layoff Policy (EMP-str-B): The Company has maintained a consistent no-layoff policy. KLD 
has not assigned strengths for this issue since 1994. 
Cash Profit Sharing (EMP-str-C): The Company has a cash profit-sharing program through 
which it has recently made distributions to a majority of its workforce. 
Employee Involvement (EMP-str-D): The Company strongly encourages worker involvement 
and/or ownership through stock options available to a majority of its employees through gain 
sharing, stock ownership, sharing of financial information, or participation in management 
decision-making. 
Strong Retirement Benefits (EMP-str-F): The Company has a notably strong retirement benefits 
program. 
Health and Safety Strength (EMP-str-G): The Company is noted by the US Occupational Health 
and Safety Administration for its safety programs. KLD began assigning strengths for this issue 
in 2003. 
Other Strength (EMP-str-X): The Company has a good employee safety record or demonstrates 
other noteworthy commitments to its employees’ well being. 
 
 
CONCERNS 
 
Poor Union Relations (EMP-con-A): The Company has a history of notably poor union relations. 
Health and Safety Concern (EMP-con-B): The Company recently has either paid substantial 
fines or civil penalties for willful violations of employee health and safety standards, or has been 
otherwise involved in major health and safety controversies. KLD changed the name of this 
rating from Safety Controversies in 2003. 
Workforce Reductions (EMP-con-C): The Company has reduced its workforce by 15% in the 
most recent year or by 25% during the past two years, or it has announced plans for such 
reductions. Before 1994, the concern is only assigned to companies that have laid-off 15% of 
workers in the most recent year. 
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